The Rise of Muscovy by Neal, Jeffrey L.
Western Oregon University
Digital Commons@WOU
Student Theses, Papers and Projects (History) Department of History
2006
The Rise of Muscovy
Jeffrey L. Neal
Western Oregon University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wou.edu/his
Part of the European History Commons
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of History at Digital Commons@WOU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Student Theses, Papers and Projects (History) by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@WOU. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@wou.edu.
Recommended Citation
Neal, Jeffrey L., "The Rise of Muscovy" (2006). Student Theses, Papers and Projects (History). 156.
https://digitalcommons.wou.edu/his/156
 1
 
 
 
 
The Rise of Muscovy 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
Jeffrey L. Neal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Senior Seminar: HST 499 
Professor Benedict Lowe 
Western Oregon University 
June 16, 2006 
 
 
 
Readers  
Professor David Doellinger 
Professor John Rector 
 
 
Copyright © Jeffrey L. Neal, 2006 
 2
 
 
 
Kievan Rus which was founded in 880 was made up of a 
loose knit alliance between small city states in what is 
today western Russia. The most powerful of these city 
states was Kiev. During the early thirteenth century the 
Mongol continued their march west until they conquered 
Kievan Rus in 1240. Although the Mongol did not occupy the 
Russian lands, the Kievan Rus period era was effectively 
over. The turmoil that followed the Mongol invasion allowed 
for Moscow, a previously weak and minor principality to 
rise out of the shadows and become a major political 
player. The goal of this paper is to examine how Moscow 
rose to power; this will be done by following the evolution 
of the Moscow princess attitudes towards their authority 
and right to rule, between the years 1325 until 1584.  
To understand process of centralization in Moscow, 
several interpretations have arisen. Several historians 
have examined the Mongols contributions to the Muscovite 
state, while others’ interpretations viewed the Muscovites 
as rising to power in spite of the Mongols.  
In recent years much scholarship has been directed 
towards the question of how the Mongols influenced the rise 
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of the Muscovite state. There has been three basic 
interpretation of the rise of Moscow. They are: complete 
denial of Mongol influence, recognition of Mongol 
influence, but gave the influence negative attributes, and 
attributed the rise of Moscow to the Mongol influence.    
The first historians to interpret the Russian history 
during the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth century 
moved the political domination of the Mongols over the 
Kievan Rus principalities into obscurity. Unfortunately 
this view lasted well into the twenty first century. As 
Nicholas V. Riasanovsky states, when examining Mongol rule 
over Kievan Rus historians have two avenues of 
interpretation: “the first denied all long range 
significance to the Mongol conquest of Russia, the second 
considered it lastingly important in terms of its 
destruction, burden, and pressure”.1 This unfortunate 
interpretation ran rampant throughout historians’ works. As 
Valentine Tschebotarioff-Bill states the second phase of 
Russian development happened in spite of the Mongol 
oppression.2 Charles Halperin further expands, and gives a 
reason why the Mongols contribution to the people of Kievan 
Rus was overlooked. The Russian political, social, and 
                                                
1 Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, Oriental Depotism and Russia, Slavic Review, Vol.22. No.4. (Dec., 1963) 
648 
2 Valentine Tschebotarioff-Bill, The Circular Frontier of Muscovy, Russian Review, Vol. 9, No.1. (Jan., 
1950) 45. 
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moral level was so superior to the Mongols, that borrowing 
from them was unthinkable.3 
 The second type of interpretation can be seen in the 
historian Michael Cherniavsky’s, 1959 work, “Khan or 
Basileus: An Aspect of Russian Mediaeval Political Theory.” 
Cherniavsky sees the Mongol invasion and occupation of 
Russia as an interruption of Russian history.4 The focuses 
of his article is on how the Mongol occupation of Russia 
changed “Russia’s image of her ruler”.5 He proposes that the 
image of the Mongol Khan replaced the Byzantine emperor as 
their image of power. The way that Cherniavsky frames his 
article, cast the Mongols in a negative light. Cherniavsky 
states that he is going to “deal with only one aspect of 
the general problem of the Mongol Yoke and the changes in 
Russian society and life induced by it”.6  
Cherniavsky used a letter from Emperor John 
Cantacuzene to Grand Prince Simeon the Proud,7 service 
books, Sophia chronicle, Nikon chronicle, trinity 
chronicle, and diplomatic correspondence. Cherniavsky chose 
these sources because they either dealt with direct 
                                                
3 Charles J. Halperin, Russia in The Mongol Empire in Comparative Perspective, Harvard Journal of 
Asiatic Studies, Vol. 43, No. 1. (June. 1983) 239. 
4 Michael Cherniavsky, Khan or Basileus: An Aspect of Russian Mediaeval Political Theory,  Journal of 
the History of Ideas, Vol. 20, No. 4. (Oct. -Dec., 1959): 459. 
5 Cherniavsky, 460. 
6 Cherniavsky, 459. 
7 Cherniavsky, 460. 
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interaction between the Mongols and the Russian, or 
addressed how the Russians worshiped the Tsar. The question 
that Cherniavsky asked form the sources he used was: how 
did the Russians perceive the power of the Tsar?  
Cherniavsky’s interpretation of the rise of the 
Muscovites does recognize that there was influence from 
both the Khan and the Basileus8. However Cherniavsky 
believes that the Basilues’ influence resulted in positive 
qualities of future Tsar, and that Khan’s influence 
resulted in negative qualities. Cherniavsky use Ivan IV to 
exemplify the contrasting influences. He says that Ivan IV 
(from the Khan) Killed by day (from the Basilues) and 
prayed by night.9  
Fortunately this interpretation of the Mongol conquest 
of Kievan Rus started to slowly erode during the 1960’s. 
This changing interpretation can be seen in the works of 
historians Edward Louis Keenan, and Karl Wittfogel. They 
acknowledge that the people of Kievan Rus and Muscovy did 
borrow some institution from the Mongols, but do not deem 
this borrowing as a positive result for the Muscovites. 
Karl A. Wittfogel’s article “Russia And The East: A 
Comparison And Contrast” was published in 1963. He 
                                                
8 Cherniavsky uses the term Basilues, which refers to the emperor of Constantinople.    
9 Cherniavsky, 476. 
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addresses the question, how did the Princes of Moscow come 
to build an autocratic state. He believes that it is based 
on an Asiatic model borrowed form the Mongols. Wittfogel 
uses the Hydraulic approach, which was first used by Karl 
Marx, to explain how the building of dams, levees, and 
dikes impacted Asiatic societies.10 As this indicates 
Wittfogel presents his paper in a Marxist light.11  He 
stresses the importance of class stratification in Russian 
and Oriental societies.12 Wittfogel also deems that the 
previous empirical methods used by historians do not fully 
comprehend the patterns of the “Orientalized” state and 
society.13 He refers to these patterns to justify his 
reliance on Marxist theory. 
Wittfogel uses the Nikon Chronicle, diplomatic 
correspondence, and the writings of Staden, who served 
under Ivan the IV as his primary sources. He asked three 
basic questions from the primary sources. How did the 
Mongol political institutions work, how did the Mongols 
govern the lands of Kievan Rus, and what was the 
interaction between the Russians and Mongol?  
                                                
10 Karl A. Wittfogel, Russian and the East: A Comparison and Contrast. Slavic Review Vol. 22, No. 4. 
(Dec., 1963):631. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Wittfogel, 629. 
13 Wittfogel, 634. 
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Wittfogel article is meant to criticize the views of a 
fellow historian named Vasily Kliuchevsky. Kliuchevsky “did 
not equate the Muscovite and Oriental despotism, although 
he recognized important similarities between them.”14 To 
build up his argument, that Oriental despotism did happen 
in Russia, Wittfogel borrows ideas and interpretation from 
other historians to help substantiate his claim.15  
Edward Louis Keenan wrote his article “Muscovy and 
Kazan: Some Introductory Remarks on the Patterns of Steppe 
Diplomacy” in 1967. As the title implies, Keenan focuses 
the majority of his writing on the patterns of steppe 
diplomacy. He uses patterns to help reevaluate the primary 
sources.16 Keenan takes a very scientific approach to his 
work. He states: “we are so far from adequate understanding 
of many of these subjects that we cannot be squeamish about 
borrowing any applicable method from the faster-moving 
sciences.”17 Keenan’s article is based on cross-referencing 
sources to build new historical data, which is quite 
different from what the other historian being examined did 
in their work. This made the questions that they asked of 
the sources very different.    
                                                
14 Wittfogel, 629. 
15 Like Marx, Bodin, Chaadaev, Kovalevsky, Max Weber, Dr. Spuler, Paul Miliukov. 
16 Edward Keenan, Muscovy and the Kazan: Some Introductory Remarks on the Patterns of Steppe 
Diplomacy, Slavic Review Vol. 26, No. 4. (Dec., 1967): 548. 
17 Keenan, 548. 
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Keenan is primarily trying to expand the knowledge of 
the diplomatic relations between the different states that 
occupied the steppe during the turbulent Middle Ages. He is 
saying that the previous historians did not have access to 
the knowledge of the sources, because his “pattern” work 
has revealed distinctly new insight into the working of the 
diplomatic relations of the various states on the steppe. 
Keenan believes that the Muscovite state was able to gain 
dominance over the other principalities, because it did not 
challenge the steppe societies.18 He makes the distinction 
that there was no need for Moscow to challenge the Mongols, 
because its goals were the opposite of the Mongols, the 
resulting autonomy allowed for Moscow’s growth.19   
In the 1980’s and 1990’s the full recognition of the 
Mongol influence in Muscovy was acknowledged: by the likes 
of Halperin, David Morgan, and Donald Ostrowski. Halperin 
looked at the political history of the Golden Horde’s rule 
over Russia, and then examined how these political 
institutions of the Golden Horde had impacted the lives of 
the Russians citizens and princes. Halperin goes beyond 
just looking at how the Mongols influenced the Muscovites; 
he also explains why the Mongols were only viewed as 
                                                
18 Keenan, 557. 
19 Ibid. 
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destructive by the medieval chroniclers. He labels his 
explanation “the ideology of silence.” Halperin outlines 
how the ideology of silence has affected the recording of 
the history of Kievan Rus during the Mongol Yoke, and the 
first few interpretations of the Mongol Yoke by medieval 
historians.  
Halperin reinterprets the rise of Moscow by arguing 
that the Muscovite princes worked within the Mongol 
political system to help propel themselves to the top of 
Russian politics. The Muscovite princes used the Mongol tax 
system to help strengthen their position in Russia by 
exempting themselves from taxes and making the difference 
up by raising taxes on the rest of the population20. This 
method allowed them to increase their wealth and power, but 
avoid confrontation with the Khan. The Moscow Princes 
allied itself with the Golden Horde during the first half 
of the fourteenth century,, which encouraged the Mongols to 
direct raids against Moscow’s enemies21. Once again this 
critical aspect of Muscovy and Mongol relationship is often 
left out of many chronicles and the first monographs 
written about the Mongols conquest of Kievan Rus. To 
                                                
20 Halperin, 78. 
21 Halperin, 79. 
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suggest that Moscow collaborated with the Mongols was 
unthinkable. 
Halperin also states that the destructive power of the 
Mongols encouraged migration to Moscow because it was 
considered a safe place. Due to its alliance with the 
Golden Horde, many people went to Moscow22. During medieval 
times manpower was perhaps the greatest asset a 
principality could have, and the influx of population 
greatly strengthened Moscow. The Moscow princes were able 
to ally with the Golden Horde when it was strong and 
challenged the Horde when it weak, giving them great 
success in their attempt to gain greater autonomy and 
dominate the other Russian city-state. 
David Morgan places more emphasis on the Mongols from 
the time Chingis Khan united the tribes in 1206 until the 
death of the last Yuan emperor in China in 1370. This focus 
on the Mongols themselves provides a very unique analysis. 
Morgan provided an explanation of how the Mongols developed 
their complex administration system by borrowing ideas from 
the Chinese and from the Arabs, then combining them to make 
them their own.  
Morgan’s sources are very elaborate, using Kievan Rus 
chronicles, firsthand accounts, recorded folklore, Chinese 
                                                
22 Halperin, 80. 
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court records, and Arabian records. His amount and type of 
sources used differed from the other historians, because he 
focused on all four kingdoms of the Khans and not just the 
Golden Horde. In particular his chapter on the “Nature and 
Institutions of the Mongol Empire” was incredibly helpful 
in understanding how the Mongols operated.23 
Ostrowski methodology is not much different that the 
other historians, but he does not recognize his work as the 
truth. He understands that there is no way to be completely 
certain about the past. As he states, the sources from the 
thirteenth and fourteenth century are meager at best,24 and 
“much of what I am arguing, therefore, is based on 
inference, deduction, and a degree of speculation.”25 This 
is a direct consequence of the Postmodern criticism of 
historical study, that the past is unknowable. Therefore 
Ostrowski is not claiming to be providing a concrete 
analysis of the past, but instead he acknowledges the 
problem facing historians26 and presents an argument that is 
to the best of his ability. 
The primary sources that Ostrowski relied on were 
diplomatic correspondence and administrative records. 
                                                
23 David Morgan, The Mongols (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 84. 
24 Donald Ostrowski, The Mongol Origins of Muscovite Political Institutions, Slavic Review Vol. 49, 
No. 4. (Winter, 1990): 526. 
25 Ostrowski, 526. 
26 Problems include gaps in historical records, inherent and intended biases in sources, and the multiple 
means of human language.  
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Ostrowski chose these sources, because he was writing a 
political history. The questions that Ostrowski asked of 
the primary sources are very prudent to his topic. He asks 
the same question from both the Muscovite and the Mongol 
sources: what type of political institutions did they use? 
He then takes this information and cross-references it to 
draw similarities between the two.     
Even though many gains have been made toward 
understanding the full impact that the Mongol rule had on 
the rise of the Muscovy state, it can hardly be called 
complete. Historians have said little about how the Khan’s 
absolute power changed and shaped the Moscow princes’ view 
of power. The Mongols sent the Muscovites on their way to 
developing a true autocracy. 
When the Mongol conquered Kievan Rus, they brought 
many new and foreign ideas and customs with them, possibly 
the most important was the idea of complete and absolute 
power. The Khans had complete power over their people; they 
were supreme and unchallenged rulers. This type of 
leadership was superior to the local power base of Kievan 
Rus. The Khan was able to force the Princes and Boyars to 
travel great distances to pay him tribute. Not only did 
they pay him tribute, they were forced to bow to the 
Mongols idols and to the Khan. This meant that they 
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completely submitted themselves to the Kahn, even at the 
expense of renouncing their Christian Faith.  
This policy of the Mongols which required complete 
submission form the princes, created a new idea of absolute 
power for the people of Kievan Rus and Moscow in 
particular. This was not the only contribution that led the 
city of Moscow to gain prominence over the other cities of 
Kievan Rus, but the idea of absolute power was the 
foundation that the Muscovites needed to build their 
autocracy. 
    The fragmented political structure that existed in 
Kievan Rus and in Moscow can be seen in the early 
testaments of the Grand Princes of Moscow. These testaments 
were written by the Grand Princes and acted as will. To 
observe the evolution of the Moscow princes’ perceived 
notion of power, this paper will examine the testaments 
from Ivan Kalita, Ivan III, and Ivan IV. The will of these 
leaders demonstrates the development of absolute power.  
Ivan Kalita wrote his testament in 1339, Ivan III in 
1503, and Ivan IV’s in 1572. I chose Kalita’s testament 
because it indicates how the grand princes traditionally 
viewed power. Ivan III’s testament illustrates a 
significant change in how he viewed his role as grand 
prince. Ivan IV’s testament is the final culmination of the 
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grand princes changing view of power. These testaments give 
an insight into how power was divided among the princes and 
how they viewed their role as Grand Prince. 
Ivan Kalita’s was grand prince of Moscow from 1328 
until 134127. He ruled during a period of transition for 
Muscoy. Under Kalita Moscow began to become a more 
prominent state. As his testament demonstrates the Moscow 
still suffered from a fragmented political structure. Ivan 
Kalita does not specify an heir to his throne. He divides 
his land holdings and titles between his three sons Seman, 
Ivan, and Andrey.28 This creates three Moscow princes that 
all have a legitimate claim to the throne. Kalita also 
divided up the city revenues between his three sons and his 
princess.29 His princess got the revenue from Osmnicheye, 
while his sons shared revenue from all the other cities.30 
Perhaps the most important resource in medieval time was 
man power. Kalita also dictated that his three sons would 
equally manage the enrolled people.  
Ivan Kalita partitioned his titles, land holding, and 
resources equally to his three sons. This created a 
problem. The resources of Moscow are not being used in a 
                                                
27Howes, Robert craig. The Testaments of the Grand Princes of Moscow Cornell University, NY, 1967. 
pg 180.  
28 Howes, 182-183. 
29 Howes, 184. 
30 Ibid. 
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unified manner. Tax revenue and military power is going in 
three different directions. The fragmentation of this 
political system leads to a weak state, which in turn 
hampers the ambitions of the grand princes and the growth 
of Moscow.  
Ivan III was grand prince of Moscow from 1462 until 
1506.31 By the end of his reign, the Mongols no longer had 
control over the Russian lands.32 This allowed for him to 
start a rapid centralization of power in Moscow. Ivan III 
will demonstrates several changes in the idea of power held 
by the Muscovite princes. In the second paragraph of his 
will Ivan III specifies that his younger sons should obey 
their older brother, Vasiliy in all things.33 This statement 
by Ivan III creates a strict hierarchal system where the 
oldest son is the undisputed ruler, unlike Ivan Kalita, 
where his three sons where treated as near equals. 
Ivan III clearly states that Vasiliy gets all of Ivan 
III’s grand principalities.34 This means that Vasiliy is 
granted all of the tax rights and the right to rule over 
the enrolled people.35 This is in stark difference to what 
Ivan Kalita left in his will. Kalita divided the taxes and 
                                                
31 Howes, 267. 
32 The Mongol occupation of Russia ends in 1480. 
33 Howes, 269. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Howes, 270. 
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the rule of the enrolled people evenly between his three 
sons.  
Vasiliy was given the right to exclusively coin money, 
and administrate justice.36 These stipulations give Vasiliy 
complete control over the finances and the court system. 
Vasiliy’s control over such important systems cements his 
role as the complete and dominate ruler. 
Ivan III was also the first grand prince to justify 
his rule with divinity. He stated that God had given him 
his Principalities.37 This justifies his and future grand 
princes absolute rule over the boyars and people. 
Ivan III’s decision to leave all of his power to his 
eldest son had important repercussion. It effectively 
created a stable line of secession, which in turn allowed 
for the grand princes to focus all the resources of Moscow 
in one direction, allowing them to expand their sphere of 
influence.       
Ivan IV took the throne in 1547 and died on 1584.38 His 
will shows the final progression of the changing ideals of 
power, when he blesses his Son Ivan I with the entire 
Russian Tsardom.39 This shows that the Muscovite grand 
princes now view themselves as the ruler of all of Russian. 
                                                
36 Howes, 273. 
37 Howes, 269. 
38 Howes, 304. 
39 Howes, 314. 
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The term Tsar had traditionally been reserved for the 
Mongol Khan or the Emperor of Constantinople. The Muscovite 
princes now viewed themselves as all powerful much like the 
Khan and Emperor did.  
Many historians have commented on how Moscow princes’ 
created a centralized state, but few have mention why the 
princes’ created a centralized state. I believe that the 
princes’ idea of power evolved due to influence from the 
Khan’s absolute power. 
The testaments of Ivan Kalita, Ivan III, and Ivan IV 
show a clear change in the way that the Muscovite princes 
viewed the idea of power. Not surprisingly, the growth of 
Moscow paralleled the grand princes changing idea of power. 
Kalita left eight cities and principalities to his three 
sons. Ivan III left eighty seven cities and principalities, 
and Ivan IV left one hundred sixty two cities and 
principalities.  
The rise of Muscovy consisted of a complex and 
complicated system of events. However it is clear that the 
changing ideas of power of the grand princes had an 
important function in the growth of Moscow. Ivan IV ruled 
over a centralized and autocratic state that allowed him to 
spread his dominion over all the Russian lands. 
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